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Augustine famously claims every word is a name. Some readers take Augustine to
thereby maintain a purely referentialist semantic account according to which every
word is a referential expression whose meaning is its extension. Other readers think
that Augustine is no referentialist and is merely claiming that every word has some
meaning. In this paper, I clarify Augustine’s arguments to the effect that every
word is a name and argue that ‘every word is a name’ amounts to the claim that for
any word, there exist tokens of that word which are autonymous nouns. Augustine
takes this to be the result of universal lexical ambiguity or equivocity (that is, the
fact that every word has more than one literal meaning) and I clarify how
Augustine’s account of metalinguistic discourse, which is one of the most detailed
to have survived from antiquity, differs from some ancient and modern theories.
When I was initiated into the mysteries of logic and semantics,
quotation was usually introduced as a somewhat shady device,
and the introduction was accompanied by a stern sermon on the
sin of confusing the use and mention of expressions. (Davidson
1979, p. 27)
1. Introduction
Augustine’s importance for and influence upon the history of philo-
sophical thought concerning language is difficult to overestimate, but
there is significant disagreement over precisely what Augustine’s views
are. This divergence is especially apparent concerning Augustine’s De
Magistro, which examines how we learn things through language and
offers one of the most extensive ancient treatments of how, to use
Davidson’s phrase, language ‘turns on itself’ (1979, p. 27).1 Augustine’s
remarks in De Magistro, notably his saying ‘every word is a name’
(Mag. 5.116.18), have inspired a number of readers to think that
Augustine maintains a thoroughly referentialist or extensional
1 Cf. Sluiter (1997, p. 218).
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits
non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original
work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-
use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.com









ind/fzaa043/5934834 by guest on 09 D
ecem
ber 2020
semantics according to which every word has some extension which is
its meaning. Against such readings, Myles Burnyeat (1987) has influ-
entially argued that Augustine does not equate a linguistic expression’s
meaning with its extension and that in saying ‘every word is a name’
Augustine merely means that all words have some meaning.
In this paper, I clarify Augustine’s principal arguments to the con-
clusion that every word is a name and his views about autonymy.
While I think that Burnyeat is right to resist referentialist interpreta-
tions, I argue that in saying ‘every word is a name’ Augustine is not
merely claiming that all words have some meaning, but that for any
word, there exist tokens of that word which are autonymous nouns
and that this is what the claim ‘every word is a name’ amounts to. I go
on to explain how Augustine accounts for autonymy by appealing to
universal lexical ambiguity or equivocity (the view that every word has
more than one literal meaning) and clarify how this differs from some
ancient and modern theories of quotation and metalinguis-
tic discourse.
2. Augustinian pictures of language
Augustine’s De Magistro begins as an inquiry into why we speak. Early
on, it is assumed that words are signs (signa) and the conversation
between Augustine and his son Adeodatus turns to what these signs
signify. In considering a verse from Vergil, ‘Si nihil ex tanta superis
placet urbe relinqui’ (‘If it pleases the gods that nothing be left of so
great a city’, Aeneid 2.659), the interlocutors assume that each word is
a sign and that for any word, there is something (aliquid, Mag. 2.3) it
signifies. Later on in the dialogue, Augustine suggests that ‘word’ and
‘name’ are signified by each other (Mag. 5.11) and when Adeodatus
proposes that certain words (for example, ‘si’ [‘if’], ‘ex’ [‘from’]) are
words but not names (Mag. 4.9, 5.11), Augustine proceeds to offer
several arguments towards the conclusion that ‘just as every name is
a word, so too every word is a name’ (ut omne nomen verbum est, ita
omne verbum nomen [est], Mag. 5.12; cf. Mag. 5.13, 6.1718).2
There have been two principal ways of understanding what
Augustine might mean by saying ‘every word is a name’. According
2 ‘We can correctly call all words “names”’ (recte possumus omnia verba nomina dicere, Mag.
5.13); ‘all words are names’ (omnia verba nomina, Mag. 6.17); ‘all parts of speech can be called
names’ (omnes partes orationis, et nomina posse dici, Mag. 6.18). Note that ‘nomen’ can be
translated as ‘name’ or ‘noun’.
2 Tamer Nawar
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to one widespread view, Augustine endorses a referentialist semantics
according to which every word (not just proper names — as per
Millian views — but every word) is a referential expression whose
extension is its meaning or signification. Such an interpretation of
Augustine is famously articulated by Wittgenstein in the opening of
his Philosophical Investigations (though he was there thinking of
Augustine’s Confessions),3 and has also been endorsed in several philo-
sophical studies of Augustine’s views. Thus, for instance, in a detailed
study of Augustine’s thought concerning language, Christopher
Kirwan takes Augustine to maintain and perhaps even inaugurate a
strongly referentialist account of meaning akin to the kind of ‘“Fido”-
Fido’ accounts of language famously derided by Ryle (Kirwan 1989,
pp. 37, 43, 479). Equally, in his translation of De Magistro, Peter King
also adverts to Ryle’s remarks and suggests that, for Augustine, ‘a
proper name (sign) names (signifies) its bearer (significate), so that
meaning is taken to be a kind of labelling of things’ (King 1995,
p. xviii).
According to such readings,4 Augustine is thought to maintain a
purely referentialist account of meaning or signification according
to which:
(i) every word is a name or referential expression;
(ii) every word has some extension; and
(iii) the meaning or signification of a word is its extension.
Philosophers who are thought to closely follow Augustine, such as
Anselm, are often ascribed similar referentialist views and an
‘Augustinian semantics’ has been attributed to them on that basis
(for example, King 2004).5
According to another view, championed by Myles Burnyeat (1987),
Augustine’s remarks concerning all words being names is not an es-
pousal of referentialism and should instead be understood against the
3 Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations §1; cf. Philosophical Grammar 567; Brown Book 1;
Glock (1995, p. 41).
4 For example, Sirridge (1976); Lyons (1977, pp. 216, 224); Bearsley (1983); Kirwan (1989);
Rist (1994, pp. 27, 314316); King (1995, but cf. King 1995, pp. xviiin24, 120n50; 2014, pp.
295, 308n4).
5 One can find later medieval figures, such as Buridan, describing such views before
repudiating them (for example, Buridan Quaestiones longe super Librum Perihermeneias 1.2).
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background of ancient disputes over whether only nouns and verbs
possess independent meaning or signification (a view associated with
various Platonists and Perpipatetics),6 or whether all parts of speech
have some independent signification (a view Burnyeat associates with
the Stoics) so that every word expresses some meaning (lekton, cf.
dicibile, Dial. 5) and thereby makes a contribution to the truth-
conditions of sentences in which it occurs which goes beyond merely
‘combining and embellishing’ (Burnyeat 1987, pp. 1011).7 In saying
‘every word is a name’, Burnyeat’s Augustine takes the side of the
Stoics and Augustine’s principal claim should thus be understood
as follows:
The substantive claim — but it is not very radical — is that even
connectives make a distinct, hence nameable, contribution to
speech. The reason Augustine insists on this, I think, is that his
topic is teaching. He wants to say that every word contributes to the
information content of the sentences in which it occurs, to what is
taught by them. That is the burden of the thesis that all words are
names. (Burnyeat 1987, p. 11)
On Burnyeat’s view, Augustine is claiming that every word has some
independent meaning and Burnyeat goes on to suggest that Augustine
does ‘distinguish between what a word signifies and the way in which
it signifies’ (Burnyeat 1987, p. 12) in such a way that he should not be
construed as a referentialist.
I take Burnyeat to be correct in resisting referentialist readings of
Augustine. Within De Magistro, Augustine discusses co-extensive lin-
guistic expressions which differ in signification. Thus, for instance,
Augustine points out that the term ‘coloured’ has as its extension the
6 Platonists seem to have variously maintained that terms which are not nouns or verbs (as
they characterised nouns and verbs) either: do not signify at all (for example, Plutarch Quaest.
Plat. 1009d8e1); do not signify substances or accidents or activities (for example, Ammonius
In De Int. 11.816); or do not express propositional constituents and have a purely syntactic as
opposed to semantic function (for example, Plut. Quaest. Plat. 1011a6ff; Apuleius In De Int. 4).
We find similar views ascribed to Theophrastus and other Peripatetics (for example, Simplicius
In Cat. 10.2311.1; cf. Schol. D. Thrax, GG 1.3, 516.1027).
7 The Stoics distinguished five parts of speech: (a) proper name (ὄnoma); (b) common
noun or appellative (pqosggoqa); (g) verb (ῥῆma); (d) conjunction (sndesmoς); and (e)
article (ἄqhqon) (D.L. 7.578; GG 1.3, 517.334). There is evidence for Burnyeat’s claim (for
example, D.L. 7.58; Apollonius Dyscolus De Pronomine 67.57; cf. De Coniunctione 214.420),
but it seem that at least some Stoics may have denied that every conjunction or any article
expressed a lekton (cf. Apollonius Dyscolus De Coniunctione 248.1ff; De Pronomine 5.13; Frede
1978, pp. 667; 1987, p. 356).
4 Tamer Nawar
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set of things which are coloured {x: x is coloured} and the term
‘visible’ has as its extension the set of things which are visible {x: x
is visible}. Now, ‘coloured’ and ‘visible’ have the same extension, that
is, {x: x is coloured} ¼ {x: x is visible}, but they do not have the same
signification (for example, Mag. 5.1213, 6.17, 7.20; cf. Dial. 7).
Augustine thereby denies (iii) (at least of certain linguistic expres-
sions). Moreover, his remarks elsewhere suggest that he thinks a sign’s
signification is or offers some mode(s) of presentation of the relevant
extension (for example, ‘penis’ and a word like ‘mentula’ make the
relevant item seem different [aliter videtur, Dial. 7]),8 and that signi-
fications may be highly fine-grained (perhaps more so, for instance,
than Fregean Sinne).9
However, there are at least two reasons to be hesitant about
Burnyeat’s account. First, relatively little direct evidence has been
provided for interpreting Augustine’s remarks about every word being
a name in the manner Burnyeat proposes and one might worry that if
one is not a referentialist, then saying ‘every word is a name’ seems
like an infelicitous way of expressing the thesis that every word has
some meaning.10 Secondly, and more importantly, Burnyeat offers
little discussion of the arguments by which Augustine aims to estab-
lish that every word is a name (at Mag. 5.1316) and it is not clear
whether they do aim to show what Burnyeat suggests.
In what follows, I offer an analysis of Augustine’s arguments and
defend a different reading of what Augustine means when he says
‘every word is a name’. On my view, Augustine is saying that for
any word, there exist tokens of that word which are autonymous
nouns and thereby names of themselves. Something like the autonymy
reading or metalinguistic reading I defend seems to find partial
8 Augustine thinks a spoken utterance’s meaning lies hidden in the sound (latet in sono,
Mag. 10.34) and is an incorporeal entity (akin to the soul of a word) intersubjectively grasped
by competent speakers when they hear the relevant utterance (for example, Quant. An.
32.656; cf. Dial. 5).
9 Frege thinks ‘but’ and ‘and’ differ in Färbung and conventional implicature but not in
Sinne (cf. Frege 1956, pp. 2956). Augustine would seemingly take such expressions to differ in
signification.
10 The strongest evidence thus far adduced in favour of construing ‘every word is a name’
in the way Burnyeat suggests is offered by Bermon (2007, p. 309), who points to a passage in
Simplicius where three senses of ‘name’ (ὄnoma) are noted. The relevant sense applies the term
‘name’ to x when x is co-ordinated (katatetagm¼non) with something signified
(sgmainomenon) (Simpl. In Cat. 27.1621).
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precedent in some brief remarks made by Burnyeat himself,11 but has
not been adequately defended or explained and is not favoured by
those who have offered more detailed discussions of Augustine’s argu-
ments in the relevant part of De Magistro (for example, Sirridge 1976;
Bermon 2007, pp. 295ff).12 There is some evidence that something like
the reading I defend may have been a live option in Augustine’s time
in that Porphyry, who influenced Augustine on other matters, claims
that every part of speech falls under the extension of ‘name’ (ὄnoma)
because (in Greek) one can attach the definite article to a word in order
to talk about the relevant word or quote it (Porph. In Cat. 62.16).13
However, Augustine betrays no direct awareness of this argument,
which requires definite articles or comparable items which Latin or-
dinarily lacks, and the principal evidence for my reading comes from
Augustine’s arguments, which seem to be very much his own. It is to
these I now turn.
3. Every word is a name
In De Magistro, Augustine offers a number of arguments for the claim
that all words are names (Mag. 5.1316). The arguments have received
relatively little in the way of detailed discussion (the notable excep-
tions being Sirridge 1976 and Bermon 2007, who closely follows
Sirridge), but they repay careful reading. In the first argument, which
we might call ‘the Pronoun Argument’, Augustine assumes a
11 Alongside the claims offered above, Burnyeat also claims that words ‘can be used to name
(stand for, refer to) their own meanings or themselves’ (Burnyeat 1987, p. 11). However, this is
compatible with several very different readings (cf. Baratin and Desbordes 1982, pp. 834;
Kirwan 1989, p. 52).
12 For example, ‘Augustine is thus arguing not that every expression of the object language
is a name-word on the grounds that it can be used as a metalinguistic name of itself. . . He did
not mean to show that every word of the object language has name-meaning on the grounds
that every expression has a self-naming use’ (Sirridge 1976, pp. 1912).
13 ‘Because “name” is not applied only to those words which have a peculiarly name-like
character, to which articles are attached, but to all parts of speech (Ὅτι τὸ ὄνομα οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ
τῶν ἰδίως ὀνομαστικὸν ἐχόντων χαρακτῆρα τάττεται, ὧν προτίθεται τὰ ἄρθρα, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ παντὸς
μέρους λόγου) because when asking whether they are homonyms, they are also attached to
articles and behave like indeclinable words (χαρακτῆρα τάττεται, ὧν προτίθεται τὰ ἄρθρα, ἀλλὰ
ἐπὶ παντὸς μέρους λόγου διὰ τὸ καὶ ταῦτα, ὅταν ἐξετάζωνται εἰ ἔστιν ὁμώνυμα, μετὰ ἄρθρου
προτεθέντος αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι καὶ κλίνεσθαί γε ὡς τὰ μονόπτωτα). For we say that andrapodi-
zesthai [“to enslave” or “to have been enslaved”] is a homonym and so on. So it is said that
“noun” applies commonly to all parts of speech’ (φαμὲν γὰρ ὅτι ‘τῷ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι ὁμωνύμῳ
ὄντι’ καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς. εἴληπται οὖν ὄνομα τὸ κοινῶς ἐπὶ παντὸς μέρους λόγου ταττόμενον, Porph.
In Cat. 62.16, trans. Strange adapted).
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traditional definition of pronouns, according to which pronouns are
things which stand in the place of names (Mag. 5.13).14 Augustine then
gets Adeodatus to cite some conjunctions (for example, ‘et’ [‘and’],
‘at’ [‘but’]), and he himself proceeds to refer back to these conjunc-
tions by saying: ‘all these’ (haec omnia) (Mag. 5.13). A pronoun (‘haec’,
[‘these’]) has stood in the place of something and pronouns — the
thought goes — stand in the place of names; therefore, the things
which they stood in place of (that is, ‘et’, ‘que’, ‘at’, ‘atque’) were
names. However, Adeodatus resists the argument, proposing that
the utterance ‘all these’ (haec omnia) was elliptical for something
like ‘all these words’ (haec verba omnia) (Mag. 5.13).
In order to convince Adeodatus that every word is a name,
Augustine proceeds to offer three further arguments to the same con-
clusion (Mag. 5.1416). One argument (Mag. 5.14), call this ‘the
Scripture Argument’, invokes a verse of scripture (Non erat in
Christo Est et Non, sed Est in illo erat [2 Cor. 1:19], ‘For there was
not in Christ “yes” or “no”, but “yes” was always in Him’). The
argument is brief, but Augustine appeals to the fact that even though
‘est’ is typically considered a verb (for example, on the basis of mor-
phological and syntactic criteria), there are tokens of ‘est’ (as in 2 Cor.
1:19) which syntactically are nouns and could only be substituted by
other nouns or noun phrases while preserving a grammatical sentence.
Thus ‘est’ is, Augustine claims, both a verb and a noun and the same
holds, Augustine suggests, of other words (Mag. 5.14).
The next argument (Mag. 5.15), call this ‘the Translation Argument’,
is directed against those who might be inclined to think that the
Scripture Argument is defective because the Apostle did not put for-
ward a grammatical sentence. The Translation Argument is also brief
and consists of Augustine imagining someone asking what terms the
Greeks use for several Latin words and proceeding to provide an
answer by translating the relevant words. For instance, ‘volo’ (‘I wish’)
is translated as ‘h¼lv’, ‘bene’ (‘well’, that is, the adverb) as ‘kal
À
xς’,
‘ab’ (‘by’ or ‘from’) as ‘ἀpo’, and so on (Mag. 5.15). The thought seems
to be that if a linguistic expression D1 in language L1 can be translated
as D2 in a distinct language L2, then: (a) there exists some signification
or meaning which is shared by D1 and D2; and (b) D1 and D2 can be
regarded as names.
14 Cf. Dositheus GL 7.401.9ff; Donatus GL 4.357.1ff, 379.23ff.
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While the rationale for (a) is clear enough in cases of accurate
translation, matters are less immediately clear when it comes to (b).
Sirridge proposes that Augustine views D1 and D2 as names of the
meaning they share (1976, p. 189) and thinks that the relevant expres-
sions refer to their meanings (Sirridge 1976, pp. 184, 1867, 1912; cf.
Bermon 2007, pp. 2979, 309, 319). However, this is not particularly
attractive (especially if, as we have seen above, Augustine does not
hold a purely referentialist semantics) and has undesirable results. For
instance, Sirridge is forced to regard ‘“from” is a one-syllable word’
and similar claims as being false (because she takes ‘from’ to refer to
the meaning of the relevant word, which, on her own view, is not
composed of any syllables, cf. Sirridge 1976, pp. 1846, 18991)
whereas such claims are in fact obvious truths (of the kind
Augustine frequently affirms, for example, Mag. 3.56, 4.95.11).15
We can better appreciate why Augustine affirms (b) by noting that
the force of Augustine’s argument depends especially upon the fol-
lowing remarks: ‘In all these parts of speech I enumerated, it can’t be
that he who asks what they are in this way would speak correctly
unless they were names’ (in his omnibus partibus orationis, quas
nunc enumeravi, recte loqui eum, qui sic interroget quod, nisi nomina
essent, fieri non posset. Mag. 5.15). These remarks indicate that the
Translation Argument does not essentially depend upon the answers
Augustine imagines providing to the relevant translation questions or
upon accurate translatability (which may be just as well because it is
not entirely clear whether the wisdom of Augustine’s time thought
that every word whatsoever could be accurately translated by another
word).16 Instead, the argument turns upon syntactical considerations
and the grammatical correctness of certain wh-questions.
Thus, for instance, in ‘quid Graeci nominent quod nos nominamus
bene?’ (‘What do the Greeks name what we name “well”?’), ‘bene’
(‘well’) — which we would say is being mentioned or quoted — is
not syntactically functioning as an adverb but as a noun or noun
phrase. Equally, in ‘quid Graeci nominent quod nos nominamus volo’
(‘What do the Greeks name what we name “I wish”?’), ‘volo’ (‘I wish’)
is not functioning as a verb or verb phrase but as a noun or noun
phrase; and the same applies to the other examples Augustine
15 Equally, even if this issue were addressed, Sirridge’s reading requires that ‘“ab” is a Latin
word’ has the same truth value as ‘“ἀpo” is a Latin word’ (cf. Sirridge 1976, p. 190).
16 Cf. Doc. Chr. 2.11.16; En. Ps. 123.8; S. Dom. Mon. 1.9.23; Jerome Adv. Iovinian. 1.13; Ad
Philemonem 20.
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provides (Mag. 5.15). Whether or not an accurate translation exists for
a given term D1, questions of the form: ‘What is D1 called?’, ‘What do
you call D1?’, ‘What do the Greeks call D1?’ and so on are grammat-
ically correct and attending to the syntax of such questions reveals that
the relevant token of D1 is a noun or name. In other words, Augustine
thinks that the fact that one can ask whether a linguistic expression D1
in language L1 can be translated indicates that D1 is a name and this
holds whether or not some accurate translation exists for D1. Insofar
as this point can be generalised and one can ask such questions con-
cerning any word or expression, then for any relevant word or ex-
pression there are tokens of that expression which are names.17
The final argument Augustine offers in De Magistro (Mag. 5.16) may
be called ‘the Complete Sentence Argument’. It receives the longest
discussion and aims to render more explicit the reasoning of the
Scripture Argument and the Translation Argument. It proceeds as
follows. After briefly explaining the view that a complete simple sen-
tence (plena sententia) which expresses a proposition (pronuntiatum,
cf. Cic. Tusc. 1.7.14; Fat. 11.26) is constituted by a noun and a verb — a
view he notes is associated with the ancient dialecticians — Augustine
offers some examples of such sentences constituted by a noun and a
verb, for example, ‘homo sedet’ and‘equus currit’. The expression
‘sedet’ (translation: ‘he/she/it sits’) does not by itself, that is, shorn
of context or an associated demonstration, constitute a complete sen-
tence or express a proposition capable of being affirmed or denied
(Mag. 5.16; cf. Dial. 1) and Augustine goes on to say:
Attend to what follows and imagine that we see something far away
and are uncertain whether it is an animal or a stone or something
else, and I say to you ‘because it is a man, it is an animal’ (Quia
homo est, animal est). Wouldn’t I be speaking rashly? (Mag. 5.16)
Augustine proceeds to argue that the relevant sentence (‘Quia homo
est, animal est’, ‘because it is a man, it is an animal’) is false or in-
appropriate in a particular context where it is not clear that the rele-
vant object is a man because ‘quia’ (‘because’) is inapt and renders the
claim false or inappropriate. Augustine adds that if one were to wish
to offer a true or appropriate assertion instead of a false or inappro-
priate one, then the word ‘si’ (‘if’) should be used in the relevant
sentence so that the new sentence would read ‘if it is a man, it is an
17 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for his or her comments concerning
this argument.
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animal’. In what follows, Augustine asks us to consider two utter-
ances. To clarify Augustine’s account, I frequently depart from mod-
ern conventions regarding quotation:
A. placet si (‘if is acceptable’, that is, ‘“if” is acceptable’)
B. displicet quia (‘because is unacceptable’, that is, ‘“because” is
unacceptable’)
Augustine gets Adeodatus to agree that each of these utterances is a
complete sentence and expresses a proposition. Thus, since A. is a
complete sentence and — according to the ancient dialecticians — a
complete sentence is constituted by at least a noun and a verb (and the
proposition expressed by such sentences is constituted by a subject
and a predicate),18 and ‘placet’ (‘is acceptable’) is the verb or expresses
the predicate and has the role of what we regard as the verbal phrase,
it follows that ‘si’ (‘if’) is the noun:
[S [VP[Vplacet]] [NP[N[si]]
In the relevant sentence, ‘si’ thus has the grammatical function of what
we would regard as the noun or noun phrase and seems to be a name
for the word ‘si’ or tokens of that word. A similar argument is offered
regarding B., where ‘quia’ (‘because’) is taken to function as a noun
or name:
[S [VP[Vdisplicet]] [NP[N[quia]]
Thus, just as there are tokens of ‘si’ which are autonymous nouns and
can be combined with a token verb to constitute a complete sentence,
so too there are tokens of ‘quia’ which are autonymous nouns and can
be combined with a token verb to constitute a complete sentence and
serve as the grammatical subject of such a sentence. The same holds of
every word (Mag. 5.16) and this seems to be an entirely general point
which turns upon the grammaticality of the relevant sentences.
Accordingly, every word is a name in that, for any word, there are
tokens of that word which are autonymous nouns and thereby names.
We can thus see how Augustine’s Complete Sentence Argument
complements and renders more explicit the reasoning of the
Translation Argument and the Scripture Argument. In each case,
what Augustine’s arguments show is not that every word is a name
of its meaning or refers to its meaning (as per Sirridge), or that every
18 Cf. Ammonius In Cat. 11.13; In De Int. 11.15.
10 Tamer Nawar
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word has some meaning or other (as Burnyeat seems to suggest).
Instead, Augustine’s claim that all words are names is a metalinguistic
thesis concerning autonymy and the burden of Augustine’s remarks in
De Magistro — and what the arguments show — is that for any word,
there are tokens of that word which are autonymous nouns and there-
by names.
4. Autonymy and quotation
In De Magistro, Augustine aims to explain the fact that all words are
names (that is, that for any word, there are tokens of that word which
are autonymous nouns) by appealing to universal lexical ambiguity or
equivocity (that is, the fact that every word has multiple literal mean-
ings).19 Thus, after the arguments just examined, Adeodatus provides
a summary of the preceding discussion (Mag. 7.198.21) and
Augustine then turns to consider the utterance ‘Is man man’ (Mag.
8.22).20 It is pointed out that the relevant sentence might be a mere list
(that is, ‘“is”, “man”, “man”’) or it might be a question of the form ‘Is
man man?’ or ‘Is “man” “man”?’ (Mag. 8.22, 24) and this, the thought
goes, is because each word in the utterance is semantically ambiguous
(ambigua) and has multiple literal meanings (Mag. 8.22). As
Augustine puts it: ‘man is found to be both an animal and a noun’
(homo et nomen et animal esse inveniatur, Mag. 10.24), that is, ‘man’
can have the same meaning as ‘mortal rational animal’ and it can also
have the same meaning as ‘the word “man”’.
To better understand Augustine’s views on how lexical ambiguity
or equivocity explains autonymy, one must examine what Augustine
says elsewhere, most notably in his De Dialectica (which, though
brief, provides one of the more detailed extant Hellenistic or post-
Hellenistic discussions of lexical ambiguity or equivocity). There,
after briefly discussing several other issues (for example, connectives,
truth-conditions and non-indicative sentences such as wishes, Dial.
19 The term ‘ambiguous’, much like the term ‘equivocal’, can indicate: (a) indeterminacy of
meaning; and (b) a multiplicity of (determinate) meanings. ‘Ambiguous’ is thus itself am-
biguous, as per sense (b). In what follows, what is at issue is (b).
20 Here, and in what follows, I again frequently depart from modern conventions concern-
ing quotation marks.
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14), Augustine asks us to consider the following two utterances
(Dial. 5):
(I) arma quae pars orationis est? (Translation: what part of speech
is wars [arma]?)
(II) arma virumque cano (Translation: I sing of wars and a man)
It seems natural to suppose that the word ‘arma’ has a different
extension in (I) from that which it has in (II). Nowadays we would
typically attempt to explain this by claiming that in (I) the word
‘arma’ is being quoted or mentioned (and denotes the word ‘arma’)
while in (II) ‘arma’ is not being mentioned but used (and denotes
wars or weapons). However, there are various ways in which one
might understand why ‘arma’ seems to have a different extension in
(I) from that which it has in (II) and it is worth considering some of
these before examining Augustine’s own views and what is distinctive
about them.
According to one traditional modern account of quotation, often
known as ‘the proper name theory of quotation’, quotation or the
application of quote-functors serves to ‘transform a sign into a name
of that sign’ (Reichenbach 1947, p. 335; cf. Quine 1940, pp. 236;
Tarski 1956, pp. 15960). On this kind of view, quotations are proper
names and the instances of ‘arma’ in (I) and (II) are taken to have
different significates because, in (I), quotation has transformed the
quoted expression ‘arma’ into a new expression whose meaning is
more or less the same as that of ‘the expression “arma”’. Thus, in
quoting a word, one in effect creates a new word (with a new mean-
ing) by introducing a name for the quoted expression.
One might be inclined to think that although Augustine does not
appeal to punctuation with a semantic function (as modern proper
name theories of quotation typically do),21 he nonetheless conceives of
what is going on with ‘arma’ in (I) along similar lines and thus the
21 It is often noted that there were no quotation marks in Augustine’s time (for example,
Burnyeat 1987, pp.1011; Kirwan 1989, p. 50; Rist 1994, p. 315) and there is significant truth to
this. There was increasing use of diacritics and punctuation marks in late antiquity (for ex-
ample, accentuation marks, Augustine Ep. 149.1.4), paqþgqajoς marks were used by scribes
for various purposes, including indicating (verse) quotations (for example, in the Derveni
Papyrus, cf. Betegh 2004, pp. 947), and Augustine’s contemporary, Rufinus of Aquileia,
may have used the diple to indicate direct quotations of reported speech (Houston 2013, pp.
1945; on other late antique uses, see Dexippus In Cat. 32.2023; Wildberg 1993 ad Simplicius
In Phys. 1327.269). However, such practises were rare and not consistently applied even by
single scribes.
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instance of ‘arma’ in (I) is missing quotation marks (or some other
device used to indicate quotation) in which it should be enclosed.
Insofar as these issues have been discussed, several readers seem
inclined to take something like this line.22 Thus construed,
Augustine would seem to be striving towards something like the ac-
count of quotation described above, albeit imperfectly because of the
absence of quotation marks (or, perhaps, for other reasons).
On this kind of view, mention or quotation allows for metalinguis-
tic discourse by introducing a new name for the mentioned or quoted
expression and insofar as any word can be mentioned or quoted any
word can be named. Accordingly, one might wish to understand
Augustine’s remarks concerning all words being names as the claim
that any word is potentially a name in that any word can be named
because, for any word, one can introduce a new expression to name
it.23 If Augustine were to be understood in this way, then his views
would resemble those of a figure like Apollonius Dyscolus, who dis-
cusses how one can quote or mention a word by attaching a definite
article to it (for example, De Constructione 34.335.4) and seems to see
the resulting quotation as a new expression which is the name of the
original uttered expression (for example, tὸ ὄnoma tῆς jvnῆς, De
Constructione 34.67, 1113).24
However, as becomes especially evident in the latter part of De
Dialectica, Augustine seems to conceive of things rather differently.
In attempting to explain cases such as the difference of the extension
of ‘arma’ between (I) and (II), Augustine appeals to universal lexical
(that is, semantic) ambiguity or equivocity (Dial. 810). Simply put,
Augustine credits the ancient dialecticians (that is, the Stoics) with
rightly perceiving that there is universal lexical ambiguity (itaque
rectissime a dialecticis dictum est ambiguum esse omne verbum, Dial.
22 Markus (1957, p. 67), Baratin and Desbordes (1982, pp. 834), and Kirwan (1989, pp.
4952; 2001, p. 198) seem to assume something like the view just described. Cf. Sirridge (1976,
p. 186).
23 For similar talk of potential and actual in this kind of context, see Edlow (1977,
pp. 408).
24 Cf. Dyscolus De Constructione 154.10155.5. Porphyry (Porph. In Cat. 62.16, cited
above), who accounts for quotation by a so-called ‘secondary imposition’ (dett¼qa h¼siς)
of a name (In Cat. 57.3258.3; cf. Dexippus In Cat. 15.16ff; Ebbesen 1981, pp. 133ff), may have
held something like Dyscolus’ view. Attaching the neuter definite article to a word in order to
quote it had long precedent, but was not consistently done (hence, for instance, the difficulties
concerning whether Aristotle’s Categories is about words or things, cf. Kneale and Kneale 1962,
pp. 267).
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9) and thinks that every word, considered on its own, is ambiguous
(quod enim dictum est omne verbum esse ambiguum de verbis singulis
dictum est, Dial. 9).25 That is to say, every word has multiple distinct,
determinate literal meanings (which are articulated by distinct defi-
nitions, Dial. 9) (cf. D.L. 7.62; Atherton 1993, pp. 13574) and is
thereby akin to a crossroads (multivium) with many paths (Dial.
8).26 Among these literal meanings or significations of every word,
there is a meaning according to which the word denotes itself and
closely associated items.
As an initial illustrative example, Augustine asks us to consider
‘magnus’ (‘great’) on its own. That same word, Augustine remarks,
may be the name of Pompey the Great (wherein it is akin to a sur-
name or nickname and refers to Pompey the Great, cf. Plut. Vit.
Pomp. 13.45; Livy 30.45), but it may also have the same meaning
as ‘the word “magnus”’ (and thus may denote the word ‘magnus’)
(Dial. 8).27 Equally, just as ‘man’ is (as Augustine puts it) both an
animal and a noun (Mag. 10.24, see above), so too ‘Tullius’ is both at
once a proper name which denotes Marcus Tullius Cicero and an
autonymous noun which denotes the word ‘Tullius’ (Dial. 10). The
25 Cf. Aulus Gellius Noctes Atticae 11.12.1; Quint. Inst. 7.9.1; Cic. Inv. Rhet. 2.40.117. Several
elements of Augustine’s account of dialectic are clearly Stoic, but he is also critical of some
Stoic views (cf. Dial. 6) and the state of the evidence makes Augustine’s precise debt to the
Stoics difficult to evaluate. For different views of the Stoic account of ambiguity, see Ebbesen
(1981; 1988); Atherton (1993); and Sluiter (1990; 1997).
26 Augustine gives sustained attention to discussing the extent of lexical ambiguity or
equivocity in De Dialectica 810 while distinguishing between various kinds of ambiguity
(ambiguitas) and equivocals (aequivoca). Augustine applies the term ‘aequivoca’ to: (a) the
diverse items signified by ambiguous words; and (b) the lexical items which have multiple
significations (Dial. 9). His taxonomy of ambiguity and equivocals is somewhat complex. The
highest category is divided into two subcategories: (i) lexical ambiguity or equivocity (one
word having multiple significations); and (ii) what might be regarded as morphological am-
biguity, wherein a token expression or graphical sequence is a form of several distinct words
(as per Augustine’s example, ‘leporem’ is the accusative singular of the noun ‘lepor’ (‘charm’)
and of the noun ‘lepus’ (‘hare’), Dial. 9). Lexical ambiguity is again divided into various
subtypes and these into further subtypes again (cf. Ebbesen 1981, pp. 389). The subtype of
lexical ambiguity with which I am primarily concerned, and which accounts for autonymy, is
said to arise from the study of language (ab arte, Dial. 10).
27 Cf. ‘For example, suppose someone said “magnus” [“great”] and then was silent. Notice
the uncertainties that result from hearing the name. For what if he were going to say, “What
part of speech is it?” What if he were going to ask about its meter, “What sort of foot is it?”
What if he were going to raise a historical question, for example, “Great Pompey, how many
wars did he wage?” [. . .] For this one “magnus” that is said is a name and a trochee and
Pompey [. . .] and innumerable other things, even though not mentioned here, can also be
understood as a result of this utterance of a word’ (Dial. 8).
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same holds of ‘adverb’ (adverbium) (which, according to one sense
(notio), is an autonymous noun, that is, a name of the word
‘adverbium’, Dial. 10). Every word, the thought goes, has at least
two literal meanings, one of which denotes the word itself. (Call
this the word’s ‘autonymous signification’.) Moreover, Augustine
emphasises the polysemy of words, so that ‘Tullius’ may denote not
only Marcus Tullius Cicero but several other things closely associated
with him, such as his corpse or his statue (Dial. 10).28 Equally, when it
comes to autonymous signification, (for example) ‘magnus’ can de-
note not only the word ‘magnus’, but also the disyllabic pronunciation
/ˈmaɡ.nus/, the spelling ‘m’-‘a’-‘g’-‘n’-‘u’-‘s’, the meaning of ‘magnus’,
and various associated items (Dial. 8, see above).
Accordingly, in order to explain the difference in extension between
‘arma’ in (I) and (II) Augustine does not think there is a need for a
semantic device or a special use of language which changes the literal
meaning of the relevant quoted expression or creates a new expression
and neither is there a need for a speaker to appeal to some form of
speaker meaning to communicate something beyond the relevant lit-
eral meaning(s). That is to say, Augustine does not think that every
word is merely potentially a name in that for any word, one can create
a new expression to name it (perhaps by adding something to it, as
per the kinds of theories discussed above). Equally, Augustine is not
claiming that for any word x there is (or can be) a distinct word y
which is an orthographic and phonological doppelganger of x and acts
as a name of x (a view which might prove attractive to those inclined
to think that a word’s identity is determined purely by its meaning, as
Socrates arguably thinks in Plato’s Cratylus),29 or that for any word,
the speaker can — simply in virtue of speaker meaning — use that
28 In discussing lexical ambiguity from use (ab usu, Dial. 10) (which seems to be more
practically oriented than ambiguity ab arte), Augustine illustrates the polysemy of ‘Tullius’
with sentences like ‘Tullius freed the fatherland from ruin’, ‘Tullius is buried in this place’, and
‘You must read all of Tullius’ (Dial. 10). In each case there is a different signification and
different referent of ‘Tullus’. ‘Tullius’ is thus equivocal, but its meanings are closely related and
have something important in common (Dial. 10).
29 In the Cratylus, a word’s identity is seemingly determined by its dnamiς (its sense or
meaning, cf. Cratylus 394b3ff; Ademollo 2011, pp. 17180). On this kind of view, it also turns
out that no word is ambiguous (which may explain the condescending attitude of Plato’s
Socrates towards those preoccupied with ambiguity, cf. Sedley 2003, pp. 1534). Thus, ‘arma’
in (I) and ‘arma’ in (II) would turn out to be homonyms and homographs (and are instances of
words spelled ‘a’-‘r’-‘m’-‘a’). However, they are not tokens of the same word but of two distinct
words precisely because they have different meanings.
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word as a name (a view which may have been held by
Diodorus Cronus).30
Instead, Augustine’s view seems to be that every word is actually a
name in that the multiple meanings are already present in the seman-
tically ambiguous word and all words have at least one autonymous
meaning whereby they denote themselves (and items associated with
themselves). Whether a particular speaker uses a particular word
autonymously or not depends upon the speaker’s intention at the
time of utterance. When a speaker utters a word with the intention
of bringing the word itself to the mind of the hearer, the word is said
‘on account of itself’ (propter se). When a word is used ‘normally’, that
is, non-autonymously, to denote something other than itself (or items
closely associated with itself), it is said ‘on account of signifying some-
thing else’ (propter aliud aliquid significandum, Dial. 5). However, on
Augustine’s view, what allows for a speaker to signify x (and associ-
ated items) by using x is the fact that, among x’s literal meanings,
there is an autonymous meaning. Autonymous meaning figures
among the various literal meanings of the semantically ambiguous
word and the lexicon of the relevant language is such that the entry
for every word has multiple literal meanings, often in different syn-
tactic categories, and one of these meanings has the word functioning
as an autonymous noun.
When it comes to interpretation and how a listener or reader can
tell whether a particular token expression is being used autonymously
or not, one might think that the non-autonymous signification of an
expression should be taken as its customary or primary sense. In De
Magistro, Adeodatus is himself attracted to this ‘rule’ (regula) of in-
terpretation (Mag. 8.223) and Augustine allows that this is natural
enough (Mag. 8.24). However, Augustine thinks that, just as is the case
in interpreting ordinary (that is, non-autonymous) lexical ambiguity
and polysemy, one should always attend to context, the plausibility of
the relevant utterances, and the speaker’s likely intention (Mag. 8.24)
(otherwise one will be susceptible to what we would regard as use-
mention errors and fallacies which turn upon them, cf. Mag. 8.234;
30 Diodorus Cronus is credited with naming one of his slaves ‘however’ (Ἀllamὴn) (and
others similarly). On the patchy evidence available, he seems akin to a prefigurement of
Humpty Dumpty who thinks that if a speaker intends his words to mean such and such then
they do mean such and such (cf. Ammonius In De Int. 38.1722; Simpl. In Cat. 27.1821). If
Diodorus Cronus thought there is nothing over and above speaker meaning, then we can see
why he is meant to have claimed that no word is ambiguous (Aulus Gellius Noctes Atticae
11.12.13; cf. Sedley 1977).
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Quant. An. 32.65). Certain assumptions about the speaker (for ex-
ample, that the speaker is not guilty of significantly absurd error)
thus play an important disambiguating role in interpretation. By
attending to considerations about plausibility and the speaker’s likely
intentions, someone who hears a speaker utter ‘my bat was flying
around last night’ can tell that, in uttering ‘bat’, the speaker probably
intends to denote a flying mammal rather than an implement for
striking balls or the word ‘bat’. Equally, someone who hears a speaker
utter ‘caput disyllabum est’ can tell that the speaker is probably using
‘caput’ (‘head’) to denote a linguistic expression because even though
taking ‘caput’ to signify non-autonymously (for example, to denote a
head) yields a grammatical sentence, ‘disyllabum est’ (‘is composed of
two syllables’) can obviously only be satisfied by linguistic expressions.
However, other utterances may be more difficult to decipher.
In certain respects, Augustine’s account of metalinguistic discourse
bears resemblance to some later medieval theories of material suppos-
ition (and at least one modern theory of quotation, namely that of
Saka 1998),31 but it differs significantly from many modern accounts of
quotation which would typically: not regard (for example) ‘because is
unacceptable’ (cf. Mag. 5.16, above) as a true sentence (or even a
grammatical sentence); not maintain that the quoted expression refers
to itself or items associated with itself; not treat every quoted expres-
sion as a name (even if, like proper name theories of quotation or
demonstrative theories of quotation, they might treat every quotation
as a name or a singular term); and not regard the quoted expression as
semantically part of the sentence which quotes it (as is especially evi-
dently the case in demonstrative theories of quotation of the kind
championed by Davidson 1979).
31 In some particular sentence, a token term a was thought to materially supposit when it
denoted itself or something similar to itself. As there were several different accounts of ma-
terial supposition it is difficult to concisely state how Augustine’s account relates to them, but
while philosophers like William of Ockham took material supposition to occur non-
significatively (for example, Summa Logicae 1.64, 67), several philosophers after Ockham pos-
ited second concepts to explain material supposition significatively and were seemingly led to
accept something akin to universal lexical ambiguity (cf. Read 1999, pp. 1520). Note that the
account of Saka (who distinguishes between quotation and mention in a manner that other
modern theorists typically do not and posits an account of mention which resembles
Augustine’s account of using expressions on account of themselves) turns primarily upon
pragmatics, but (in a manner akin to Augustine and some later medieval accounts of material
supposition) he thinks a set of quotation marks ‘maps its [quoted expression] X into some
linguistic item saliently associated with X other than the extension of X’ (Saka 1998, p. 127).
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Thus, many moderns would regard the use of ‘bat’ to denote ‘bat’
(as in ‘bat is a one-syllable word’, that is, the mention of the word
‘bat’) as ‘fundamentally different’ (for example, Washington 1992, p.
582) from its use to denote (for example) an implement for striking
balls, to such an extent that they would think that a special semantic
device is required to explain the latter case and would regard ‘bat is a
one-syllable word’ as incorrect. However, on Augustine’s view, using
the word (for example) ‘bat’ autonymously to denote the word ‘bat’ is
not fundamentally different from using the term ‘bat’ to denote mem-
bers of the Mammalian order Cheiroptera or using the term ‘bat’ to
denote an implement for striking balls (and the same applies to (I)
and (II) and whether ‘arma’ denotes ‘arma’, wars, or weapons,
Dial. 5).
Augustine’s account of autonymy explains why he and his con-
temporaries regularly and unapologetically discuss linguistic expres-
sions without any quotation-like devices. (Thus, for instance, devices
such as ‘li’, as used in later medieval Latin, are very rarely present
and never necessary.)32 One might worry that Augustine’s account
multiplies literal meanings beyond necessity (cf. Grice 1989, p. 47)
and requires significant extra-linguistic knowledge and considerable
interpretative work (that is, what many would deem additional and
creative work) on the part of the hearer if customary signification(s)
and autonymous signification (or ordinary discourse and metalin-
guistic discourse) are to be told apart. However, it is important to
keep in mind that Augustine himself emphasises that ‘discussing
words with words is as entangled as interlocking one’s fingers and
rubbing them together, where hardly anyone but the person doing it
can distinguish the fingers that itch from the fingers scratching the
itch’ (Mag. 5.14, trans. King) and that he is attempting to account for
the existing linguistic and metalinguistic practices of his time (rather
than, for instance, stipulating how one should engage in metalin-
guistic discourse). Augustine would happily accept that listening
requires considerable work and one of his broader aims in De
Magistro is to show that words do not typically simply transfer
32 The use of Greek definite articles has been discussed above. It is only in later medieval
works that one finds ‘li’ or ‘ly’ (sometimes described as a ‘sign of materiality’ (signum materi-
alitatis)) used to indicate material supposition. There are differing views over the extent to
which this should be taken to resemble a quote-functor (cf. Trentman 1977, p. 86; King 1985, p.
331; Perreiah 2002, p. 2501; Dutilh Novaes 2007, pp. 28, 33, 47ff), but Paul of Venice notes
that certain thinkers thought a term only signifies materially when a sign of materiality (such
as ‘li’) governs it (Logica Magna 1.7ff).
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information from speakers to listeners without the decisive and
often creative cognitive agency of the hearer or something within
the hearer (Mag. 10.34ff; Retr. 1.12).33
5. Conclusion
In this paper I have sought to clarify what Augustine means by saying
‘every word is a name’, his arguments on behalf of that claim, and his
views concerning certain kinds of metalinguistic discourse. I have
argued that, in saying ‘every word is a name’, Augustine is not pro-
posing a referentialist thesis according to which a word’s referent is its
meaning and neither is Augustine merely claiming that every word has
some meaning. Instead, Augustine is claiming that for any word, there
exist tokens of that word which are autonymous nouns (so that every
word is a name of itself and several associated items). This, Augustine
thinks, is the result of universal lexical ambiguity or equivocity (that
is, the fact that every word has more than one literal meaning) and I
have sought to explain how Augustine thinks lexical ambiguity
accounts for autonymy while clarifying how Augustine’s views differ
from some ancient and modern theories of quotation and metalin-
guistic discourse. This has, I hope, furthered our understanding of one
of the most detailed extant accounts of how language ‘turns on itself’
to have survived from antiquity and the ways in which one might
hope to account for metalinguistic discourse without appealing to
quotation as we moderns typically understand it.34
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